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Abstract— Digital multimedia content (especially audio) is
becoming a major part of the average computer user expe-
rience. Large digital audio collections of music, audio and
sound effects are also used by the entertainment, music, movie
and animation industries. Therefore, the need for identification
and management of audio content grows proportionally to the
increasing widespread availability of such media virtually ”any
time and any where” over the Internet. In this paper, we propose
a novel framework for musical content fingerprinting using
balanced multiwavelets (BMW). The framework for generating
robust perceptual fingerprint (or hash) values is described. The
generated fingerprints are used for identifying, searching, and
retrieving audio content from large digital music databases. Fur-
thermore, we illustrate, through extensive computer simulation,
the robustness of the proposed framework to efficiently represent
musical content and withstand several signal processing attacks
and manipulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper describes the details of a novel framework for
robust perceptual fingerprinting of musical content. Perceptual
fingerprinting (or hashing), unlike conventional hashing used
in cryptography, represents a unique binary string or code that
uniquely identifies a segment of musical content similar to
personal fingerprints used to identify human beings. Several
applications can be foreseen for perceptual fingerprinting
such as: 1) content identification; 2) broadcast monitoring;
3) connected audio; 4) filtering technology for peer-to-peer
(P2P) networks; 5) automatic music library organization. The
proposed framework consists of two sub-systems: The first
system generates of extracts the fingerprint values from the
audio content, while the second sub-system applies an efficient
search scheme to identify the extracted fingerprint value from
an existing multimedia database that represents the stored con-
tent by their extracted fingerprint values. Therefore, instead of
using the musical content in the search/identification/retrieval
operations, we will base these operations on the extracted
fingerprint values which allow for efficient database queries.
In the proposed solution, fingerprint values are extracted using
an algorithm that generates bit sequences of 32 bits length
for every 11.72 ms of audio content. Then, the fingerprint
representations of 256 different audio sequences are combined
to uniquely represent every 3 sec of audio content. Such
a representation contains enough ”consistent” information to
allow for reliable content identification. It is worth noting
that with such representations, the search space has a di-
mension of 2256×32. Such a space dimension dictates an
efficient design for the fingerprint search algorithm to enable
efficient matching of fingerprint blocks in the queried database.
Obviously, this is not a trivial task, because fingerprint blocks
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Fig. 1. Proposed framework for robust perceptual fingerprinting.
are expected to have different binary representations in the
database. Many factors contribute to such differences. For
instance, we may be searching for a content that has been
represented in the database using either different file format
or compression rates such as in the case of WAV versus MP3
formats or different audio quality (CD-Quality, FM-Quality,
etc.). The foundation of the proposed system is the statistical
modeling of balanced multiwavelet representations of audio
signals. The results of the statistical model are used to build
novel robust fingerprint values for identifying manipulated
audio content. In most of the tested cases, the proposed
framework has been evaluated and informed by conducting
several performance evaluation tests. New contributions of
this work to the area of ”Computer Audition” include: robust
feature extraction from audio content, analysis of audio content
using balanced multiwavelets 1, robust technique for audio
content identification using perceptual fingerprinting. Fig. 1
shows a schematic diagram of the underlying principles of the
proposed framework for robust perceptual fingerprinting.
II. A ROBUST MUSICAL FINGERPRINTING ALGORITHM
In the remaining of this paper, we focus on the design
and implementation of a robust perceptual fingerprinting algo-
rithm. For notational convenience, we will inherently assume
that the fingerprinting extraction procedure is secured through
the use of secret keys, and therefore, we will drop the subscript
K in the representation of the fingerprint function; it will
be denoted by HX for an input content X . We present the
1To the best of our knowledge, we are unaware of audio analysis using
balanced multiwavelets reported in the literature.
corresponding design algorithm and some simulation results.
We experimentally show that the proposed algorithm achieves
Eqs. 1-2 for an extensive range of attacks.
Pr
[
D
(
HK(X),HK(Xˆ)
)
= 0
]
≈ 1, (1)
Pr [D (HK(X),HK(Y )) > 0] ≈ 1, (2)
where HK(X) and HK(Xˆ) represent the fingerprint repre-
sentations for the input X and a similar input Xˆ , respectively.
D(., .) represents a distance metric such as Hamming distance
[1] .
A. Design Principles
Perceptual audio fingerprinting aims at extracting the rele-
vant perceptual features from an audio content. At the same
time, implementation requirements impose that extracting and
searching fingerprint values should be fast and easy, prefer-
ably with a small granularity to allow system scalability in
highly demanding applications (e.g. mobile-enabled music
identification). However, many issues should be addressed
before proceeding with the design and implementation of such
systems. The most prominent ones are [1]:
• Features’ selection (semantic 2 vs. non-semantic fea-
tures).
• Fingerprint representations.
• Fingerprint granularity.
B. Fingerprint Extraction Algorithm
Most fingerprinting extraction algorithms process audio
content in a similar way to the techniques in audio coding
and processing [2]. In order to reduce the computational load,
we reduce the sampling rate of the processed audio clip by
a factor of 8. It is assumed that the input audio is sampled
at a CD-Quality rate, i.e., 44100Hz. Then, the audio signal is
segmented into audio frames. For every frame, a set of features
is computed as explained below. It should be kept in mind that
the extracted features are chosen to achieve perceptual invari-
ance to content degradations. Unlike [1] where the content
features are extracted from Fourier coefficients, we propose
the use of subband coefficients of balanced multiwavelets.
Features derived from Fourier coefficients are also proposed
in [1], [3]. In [4], Logan proposes the use of non-semantic
features based on the Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients
(MFFC). Allamanche et al. [5] propose the use of spectral
flatness, sharpness, and coefficients of the linear predictive
coding (LPC). Mathematically-derived quantities are also used
to represent the content features. These derived quantities
such as the means and variances of the features are mapped
into more compact representations using either hidden Markov
models (HMM) [6] or quantization [1]. We extract from each
audio frame an sub-fingerprint string that is not sufficient to
identify a complete audio clip. However, the combination of
2We propose to use the class of non-semantic features for their mathematical
tractability and ease of computation.
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Fig. 2. Overview of audio fingerprinting extraction.
several sub-fingerprint strings will produce a global fingerprint
value that will sufficiently describe the overall audio clip. Fig.
2 gives an overview of the fingerprint extraction procedure
proposed for the perceptual audio fingerprinting system.
Each audio frame is transformed using a one-dimensional
balanced multiwavelet transform. Then, for each audio frame
(time interval of 11.8 milliseconds), a sub-fingerprint string
of 32 bits is extracted. For an audio clip of 3 seconds, we
will have 256 different audio frames. Therefore, the system
guarantees a granularity of 3 seconds. It is worth noting that
in order to avoid signal discontinuities, we propose to use
overlapping frames with an overlap factor of 31/32 [1]. All
the audio frames are weighted with a Hanning window having
the same overlap factor of 31/32. Based on this approach, we
obtain a sub-fingerprint binary for every 11.6 milliseconds.
Furthermore, in order to capture the most important perceptual
features, we propose to use a multiresolution decomposition
based on the balanced multiwavelet transform. Such a de-
composition has the merits to provide an excellent model
of the human auditory system (HAS). On the other side,
frame boundaries have a negative effect on the content phase.
However, because the HAS system is relatively insensitive
to phase, we propose to use the coefficients’ magnitude
represented by the estimation quantization (EQ) scheme [7].
For the extraction of the sub-fingerprint binary strings, we
divide the decomposition subbands into 32 different frequency
bands. In Fig. 3 shows the approach used in the selection of
the frequency blocks for the lowpass subband at decomposition
level 5. Similar approach is used for the remaining subbands
with a varying number of blocks. Unlike the system proposed
in [1], the algorithm described here allows for a frequency
decomposition that is similar to that performed by the HAS
system which operates on the Bark scale. In [1], to obtain a
decomposition similar to the HAS-based one, a logarithmic
spectrum division is carried out to obtain 32 different blocks.
Details of the extraction algorithm are given below:
1) Downsample the input audio content of 3 sec to obtain
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Fig. 3. Frequency block selection for lowpass subband at decomposition
level 5.
a sampling rate of 5512 Hz.
2) Apply the framing division on the downsampled content
using Hanning window with an overlap factor of 31/32.
3) Compute the forward balanced multiwavelet (BMW)
transform for each audio frame using 5 decomposition
levels.
4) Divide the subbands’ coefficients into 32 different blocks
as illustrated in Fig. 3 for the case of the finer lowpass
subband.
5) Apply the estimation quantization (EQ) scheme using a
neighboring window of 5 audio samples.
6) Compute the log variances of the magnitudes of the
subbands’ coefficients.
7) Compute the mean value, µnEQ, of all the log variances
for each audio frame where n = 1, 2, . . . , 256.
8) For each of the 32 subband blocks, apply the following
formula to extract the sub-fingerprint bit:
H(n,m) =
{
1 if σ(m,n)EQ > µnEQ
0 if σ(m,n)EQ < µnEQ
1 ≤ n ≤ 256 and 1 ≤ m ≤ 32 (3)
where H(n,m) is the nth bit in the sub-fingerprint string
representing the mth audio frame.
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Statistical Analysis
Based on the similarity metric, used in the proposed system,
we declare two audio contents perceptually similar if the
normalized Hamming distance is below a specific threshold,
Th. The false positive rate, Pfp, can be directly determined
from the threshold Th [8]. For an adequate choice of Th, we
assume that the extracted fingerprint strings are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d) random variables. Therefore,
the number of bit errors will follow a binomial distribution
(n, p) [8], where n represents the length of the extracted
fingerprint strings and p represents the probability that the
extracted bit is ’0’ or ’1’. For a random variable with (n, p)
binomial distribution, the probability is given by [8]:
P {y = k} =
(
n
k
)
pk (p− 1)n+k k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n (4)
In this case, the corresponding distribution is a staircase
function [8]. An interesting asymptotic approximation for the
binomial distribution is given by the normal distribution for
sufficiently large values of n [8]. For a fixed value of p (we
have p = 0.5), and a large value of n = 8192, DeMoivre-
Laplace theorem gives the following approximation [8]:
(
n
k
)
pk (p− 1)n+k ≈ 1√
2pinp(p− 1)e
−(k−np)2/2np(p−1) (5)
where the mean is given by µ = np and the standard
deviation is given by σ = 1√
np(p−1) . Using Eq. 5, for a given
fingerprint string H1, the probability that a randomly selected
fingerprint string H2 has less than T = αn bit errors with
respect to H1 is given by [1], [8]:
Pfp(α) =
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
(1−2α)√n
e
−x2
2 dx =
1
2
erfc
(
(1− 2α)√
2
√
n
)
(6)
where α denotes the BER rate and erfc represents the error
function [8]. Finally, to take into account the larger standard
deviation of the BER distribution, Eq. 6 is modified as follows
[1]:
Pfp(α) =
1
2
erfc
(
(1− 2α)
3
√
2
√
n
)
(7)
B. System Robustness
In order to assess the robustness of the proposed fingerprint-
ing system, we need to address the issue of the performance
measure to be used during the evaluation experiments. It
is legitimate to assume a given value for the threshold Th
for the evaluation purposes. In [1], Haitsma et al. assume a
threshold of Th = 0.35. To illustrate the robustness of the
proposed algorithm, we will lower the latter threshold further
to Th = 0.25. This new threshold will be considered as the
upper performance bound for the system described herein.
Throughout the simulation carried out to assess the system ro-
bustness, we use two different audio clips, namely ”Manchild”
clip by Neneh Cherry and ”Last Breadth” clip by Abu Khater.
During the evaluation experiments, both original audio clips
will be subjected to the following signal degradations/attacks:
• MP3 Encoding/Decoding
• Lowpass and Highpass Filtering
• Noise Addition
• Silence Reduction and Addition
• Amplitude Alteration
• Echo Attacks
• Stretching and Pitch Bending
• Dynamic Delay
• Content Mixing
• Denoising and Hiss Reduction
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Fig. 4. System performance in the presence of lowpass filtering attack.
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Fig. 5. System performance in the presence of highpass filtering attack.
For illustration purposes, we report the results related to
Manchild clip only. Fig. 4 shows the robustness of the pro-
posed system against lowpass filtering attacks. The perfor-
mance curve indicates that the system is performing ade-
quately as long as the main content energy is not removed
by the filtering attack. Fig. 5 shows the robustness of the pro-
posed system against highpass filtering attack. An interesting
interpretation of the obtained performance indicates that the
content frequency from 100 Hz to 4000 Hz is crucial for a
reliable perceptual representation of the content. Fig. 6 shows
the robustness of the proposed system against MP3 compres-
sion attacks. By analyzing the performance reported, we can
conclude that under MP3 compression attack, the proposed
system yields an excellent performance for compression rates
higher or equal to 24 KBits/sec. However for compression
rates lower than this threshold value, the system performance
degrades gradually. The system robustness to various audio
attacks is illustrated in Fig. 7. It is clear from this figure that
the system performs robustly in the presence of various audio
attacks with the exception of the double stretching attack.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a novel framework for
robustly identifying audio content by using short robust finger-
printing codes. We have proven, through extensive computer
simulation, that these fingerprinting codes are robust against
various audio alterations and attacks. Furthermore, the pro-
posed fingerprint extraction mechanism yields totally different
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Fig. 6. System performance in the presence of MP3 compression attack.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Audio Attack Index
Ha
mm
ing
 D
ist
an
ce
Hashing Robustness Against Various Audio Attacks
Philips  Threshold
Mixing
Amplitude 
Fading
Double 
Stretching
Dynamic 
Delay
Dynamic Delay 
and Mixing
Hiss 
Reduction Noise 
Reduction
Pitch 
Bending
Pitch 
Correction
Silence 
Added
Silence 
Removed
Fig. 7. System performance in the presence of various audio attacks.
fingerprint sequences for different musical content.
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